A Putative (Private) Life of Hannah Arendt: Bio-portraiture as performance in the work of Miriam Shenitzer by Zank, Michael
PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 5, NO 1 (2019):128–148 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21476/PP.2019.51272 
ISSN 2057–7176 
PERFORMANCE 
PHILOSOPHY 
A PUTATIVE (PRIVATE) LIFE OF HANNAH ARENDT: 
BIO-PORTRAITURE AS PERFORMANCE  
IN THE WORK OF MIRIAM SHENITZER 
MICHAEL ZANK BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
He [Kafka, acc. to Benjamin] wanted to preserve it [viz. tradition] even though it was 
not truth, if only for the sake of this “new beauty in what is vanishing […] and he 
knew, on the other hand, that there is no more effective way to break the spell of 
tradition than to cut out the “rich and strange,” coral and pearls, from what had 
been handed down in one solid piece. 
Hannah Arendt (2019, liii) 
I’m speaking to my ancestors. And of course I don’t see eye-to-eye with my 
ancestors. But at the same time I cannot deny their existence. 
Jerzy Grotowski and Elizabeth LeCompte in Rebecca Schneider (2011, 111) 
For remembrance, which is only one, though one of the most important, modes of 
thought, is helpless outside a pre-established framework of reference, and the 
human mind is only on the rarest occasions capable of retaining something which 
is altogether unconnected.  
Hannah Arendt (1961, 6) 
We are all complicit. There are no bystanders, only degrees of perpetration, as Ute Frevert said in 
a recent speech.1 To speak of bystanders offers exculpation to people who can claim, in hindsight, 
to have committed no evil. To deny such exculpation demands a new conception of agency. It 
stipulates that we act even when we think of ourselves as not acting, as being passive, as merely 
observing the actions of other. I will use this consideration as an entry point to Hannah Arendt’s 
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insistence on the difference between the public and the private. Historically speaking, “inner 
emigration” or retreat into privacy appeared as an adequate response to totalitarian rule. But 
Arendt’s insistence on maintaining the difference between private and public cannot be used as 
an excuse for inaction in the public sphere. What does the difference between public and private 
mean for us today? I will argue that Arendt’s distinction between public and private cannot be 
maintained in the abstract. It requires concrete “performance” in order to be realized. One such 
performance I will discuss is that of Miriam Shenitzer’s A Putative Life of Hannah Arendt, a faux 
biographical series of images and objects that confounds the biographical expectation of insight 
into the intimate and private side of a thinker, turning the gaze back on the viewer and challenging 
us to reconsider our conceptions of knowledge of individuality and personality in an age of a 
massive in/voluntary erasure of the boundaries between private and public. It thus restores the 
ineffability of the individual in form of a public display that disputes access to the life of Arendt. 
Shenitzer’s “putative” biographical portrait of Hannah Arendt thus marks an Arendtian 
performance of the elusive distinction between private and public. 
Difficult freedom2 
Culpability for inaction is not a new concept. The Catholic tradition knows of sins of omission. 
Similarly, the German legal system encoded the offense of “failure to provide assistance” 
(unterlassene Hilfeleistung).3 The assumption is that if you could have acted, then you ought to have 
acted. If you can, you ought. The philosopher Immanuel Kant famously turned this sentence 
around, marking the transition from natural law to idealist ethics: Du kannst, denn du sollst (“You 
can, because you ought”; see Braun 1975 and Schöndorf 1985). If reason, or rational thought, 
commands you to do something because it is good, then you ought not to doubt your ability to 
pursue it. According to some interpreters, Kant’s categorical imperative was based on an important 
corollary, namely, that no one can hold us responsible for the impossible.4 The impossible would, 
in any circumstance, be irrational. Reason would be the measure of the difference between the 
possible and the impossible. But is it true that we are responsible only for what is possible? Cannot 
this maxim be turned into a convenient excuse? This seems to me what Hannah Arendt saw in 
Adolf Eichmann, one of the architects of the so-called “final solution of the Jewish question.” 
According to Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Arendt [1963] 2006), Eichmann 
had honed the ability to make excuses and exemplified what to Arendt was the perversion of 
thought into an instrument of self-exculpation. Arendt saw Eichmann as the apex of 
thoughtlessness in the face of evil. Although her assessment of Eichmann has been called into 
question in view of Eichmann’s diaries (Stangneth 2014), Arendt still has a point. Thought alone can 
reveal to us the difference between what we can—and therefore ought—to do, and what others 
expect of us. Contrary to what we might believe, thought is not an instrument of generalization but 
of concretization. In Heidegger’s terms, thought is precisely what drives us to overcome the power 
of general expectation, or the “man.”5 In contemporary ethics, it is Emmanuel Lévinas, another one 
of Heidegger’s “Jewish children” (see Wolin 2001, 2015) who teaches us to exceed Kant’s categorical 
imperative by making it both concrete and overwhelming. By prioritizing the face of the other, 
Lévinas teaches us, that the ought, in order to be fully ethical, must extend beyond the possible. 
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We must hold ourselves responsible in the face of the impossible. In light of the Holocaust and 
similar atrocities, the ethical imperative can no longer be limited to the possible, to what may be 
expected. It is one of the qualities of Arendt’s writing that she draws our attention to the daily, 
rather than extraordinary, occurrences of erasure of humanity, not by ecological cataclysm, but by 
our complicity in thoughtlessness and facelessness.  
We can learn from the writings of Hannah Arendt where to look for those things that prevent us 
from accepting full responsibility not just for our action but for our inaction. Where does inaction 
begin? Why is it pervasive? What leads us to adopt habits that advance the demise of the human 
and hasten the advent of the post-human? Arendt warns us that the human element, the human 
as such, is being gradually erased, and that we contribute to its erasure. We bring this erasure 
about by acting thoughtlessly. This sounds like a paradox. How can one act without thought? Is not 
thoughtlessness a lack of thought and hence a form of inaction? Here we see the parallel between 
a weak conception of thoughtlessness and the notion of the bystander. The bystander is an actor, 
as is the one who acts without thought. Thoughtlessness is more than lack of thought. It is a choice, 
an activity, an erasure rather than the result of inaction. The act of thoughtlessness accomplishes 
a self-erasure. Like an opiate, it accomplishes oblivion, a happiness without perfection, a forgetting 
of the most important element that, in the Kantian tradition, indicates our freedom and therefore 
our humanity. We seem to use our ability to think, the “freedom to be free,” only to pervert it, using 
it to abandon our tenuous selves to mechanisms of unfreedom and the erasure of genuine 
selfhood. The freedom to think is, to Arendt, the most eminent attestation of our “freedom to be 
free.” A 1967 lecture by Arendt bearing this title was recently issued for the first time in German 
(Arendt 2018). It became an instant bestseller, a harbinger of the Arendt renaissance now in full 
swing.  
This renaissance comes with perils. Thomas Meyer, the editor of that small book which has had 
such a remarkable success among contemporary German readers, now warns that Arendt has 
become all-too-easily available, her life too well-known, the standard narrative about her too 
familiar for us not to fear that what we think we know will distract or downright prevent us from 
reading Arendt carefully (Encke 2018). The Arendt myth has become a manner of dehumanizing, 
namely, de-concretizing and obscuring the private person behind the public mask.  
The difference between public and private was essential to Arendt. It is a fundamental imperative 
that those of us using “social media” violate on a daily basis. We submit our most private 
experiences to public scrutiny and to corporate abuse, surrendering what truly makes us human 
to the short-lived and seemingly ever- renewable thrill of exposure in unselfconscious (thoughtless) 
acts of exhibitionism. It seems as if we are hell-bent on cashing in our social capital without regard 
to the fact that we are allowing others to commodify what remains of our private lives. We are 
eagerly dissolving ourselves into data and we take issue with others who resist doing the same 
with themselves. The exchange value for our loss of privacy consists of what we gain in putative 
insights into the lives of others. The measure of “justice” on social platforms consists in the balance 
between “followers” and “following,” in other words, in popularity. We know of the dire 
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psychological consequence of this new exchange economy on young people, which therapists refer 
to as social media addiction.  
Miriam Shenitzer’s A Putative Life of Hannah Arendt 
At its best, visual art can perform an interruption of such trends. In the following I will describe and 
interpret a particular series of work that uses Hannah Arendt as a (putative) point of reference or, 
perhaps more accurately, as a cipher open to interpretation, while interfering with our 
assumptions about biographic information and its function in the economy of “data” (literally, 
things that are “given”). Shunning conventional “givens”—such as dates of birth and death, 
photographs, documents, and other tokens that correlate a particular life to generally assumed 
realities—Shenitzer’s putative life of Hannah Arendt confronts the viewer with drawn images, 
displayed on drawn frames, and augmented by drawn or found objects, accompanied by labels 
that falsely suggest connection with, and significance for, a life, putatively that of Hannah Arendt.  
Miriam Shenitzer’s A Putative Life of Hannah Arendt uses the encomiastic expectations associated 
with the “lives of great men” to accomplish a thorough interrogation of the categories of knowledge 
we bring to this and, by extension, any iconic figure. The title of Shenitzer’s installation of pseudo-
biographical drawings and faux-authentic objects clearly enunciates the performance of an 
epistemic aporia. By rendering the expected “life of Hannah Arendt” putative, the artist draws the 
viewer into a vexing situation. At an exhibition and seminar-style discussion of this work, one of 
the audience members ended up exasperated, asking: “What is the percentage of true information 
about Arendt presented by this work?” In other words, the viewer was disturbed by the “action” of 
the display, which invokes a name while both denying and providing access to its presence. As in 
classical aesthetic theory of drama, the effect is interactive. The performance accomplished by this 
show takes place in the interaction between words, images, and audience response. The visual 
work aims to trigger a reaction, similar to the moment of recognition (anagnorisis) experienced by 
the audience that completes the tragedy acted out on a stage, but without any real catharsis. More 
open than its classical antecedent, though no less shrouded in mystery, the interaction stimulated 
by the visual display holds no clear intention or demarcation of its success or failure. The artwork 
provokes, but does not prefigure or guide, the thought of the viewer. It is neither leading nor 
misleading. I will attempt to consider this performative accomplishment of a biographic suggestio 
falsi as an Arendtian admonition to heed the boundary between public and private lives: a 
simultaneous revealing and concealing of ineffable individuality accomplished by staging the life 
on display as identifiable and typical, yet utterly concrete and particular.  
In the following I will describe the organization of the show, its biographical taxonomy, and some 
of the images, artifacts, and the “captions” that identify what is depicted as putatively related to 
Arendt and ostensibly provides access to the “life” one might piece together from the images, 
objects, and verbal cues on display. The basis for these observations will be the documentation of 
an exhibition held at the Elie Wiesel Center for Jewish Studies at Boston University that opened on 
May 27, 2018, and was on display until the middle of August of 2018 (“About A Putative Life of 
Hannah Arendt”). What interests me in particular is the artist’s attention to the details of private life. 
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Some biographic details appear related to the actual life of Arendt (e.g., her relationships as a 
university student), while others seem to convey cryptic messages about a private life that could 
have been Arendt’s but actually wasn’t, very much like the personal messages and memories 
encrypted in the paintings of Gerhard Richter who admits that many of his paintings convey hidden 
personal meanings that only the painter himself is aware of, while leaving the audience to project 
their own assumptions onto the canvas, or reflect on a painting’s aesthetic or social meanings. Like 
Richter, Shenitzer leaves no obvious hint in the images to their private meanings except the images, 
objects, and words themselves. Nor does she indicate anywhere that the life depicted is ever any 
other than that of a putative Hannah Arendt. 
The panels of images and objects displayed nearby (at the BU exhibit these were on the surfaces 
of bookcases located beneath the walls) are organized by themes and roughly follow the typical 
chronology of an actual biography from childhood to adulthood. The drawn titles of the eleven 
panels of images (dictated by the characteristics of the space, the former boardroom of the 
university, the grand parlor of a late nineteenth-century patrician residence, a locale that evokes 
putative bourgeois European origins) read as follows:  
The Apple doesn’t Fall Far from the Tree: Family and its influence on Arendt’s Political Philosophy 
A force to be Reckoned with: The Women in Arendt’s Family 
Strange Bedfellows: Hannah Arendt and Religion 
Fuchs, Du hast den Ganz6 Gestohlen: Arendt and her Caregivers. 
A Mixed Blessing: Childhood and the Mediation of Power 
Ach, Du lieber Augustin: Arendt’s Teenage Years 
Hoppe, Hoppe, Reiter: Hannah Arendt’s Love of Sports 
Wer ist der Mann da, auf der Verandah? The Men in Arendt’s Life 
Don’t Mean a Thing, If it Ain’t Got That Swing: Hannah Arendt & the Arts 
An Uneasy Truce: Hannah Arendt and the Academy 
Which Promised Land: America or Israel? 
The range of subjects shows that this putative life of Hannah Arendt is limited to the subject’s 
formative years. Little attention is given to a later career, to marriage, old age, or death, where the 
putative life would have had to compete with the all-too-well known facts of an actual life. The 
artistic faux-biographer thus evokes the genre of the “anecdotal” biography of famous people, a 
life, character, or personality as revealed from hidden or private sources, sources that may have 
remained unmentioned by the official or authorized biographers. An antique suitcase on display 
suggests the serendipity of preservation of the artifacts of a life that was likely interrupted by the 
133 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 5 (1) (2019) 
vicissitudes of migration, as suggested by the last panel, which leaves the question of Hannah 
Arendt’s destiny without a definite answer; for example, four out of the six images the artist chose 
for the last panel of the exhibition at Boston University depict personages from among “Hannah 
Arendt’s” circle who settled in Palestine, and only two relate to an American experience of Hannah 
Arendt, foregrounding the road not taken. The biography thus leads up to the mid-century 
disruption of European Jewish lives without making it explicit. It encapsulates and suggests a world 
that was lost. 
The visual style and wording of the captions by which the panels are organized suggests silent 
movie panels or panels carried across the stage between the acts of a variety show, art forms 
associated with the historical period of the putative life being depicted. At the same time, the fact 
that the panels are drawn in the same style as the captions that go with, and sometimes are part 
of, the drawings introduces an element of irony, as ordinarily captions or titles are not part of an 
image on display in an exhibition but represent the curatorial voice, offering authoritative 
interpretation. The show intentionally blurs the lines between image and objects, captions and 
images, artistic imagination and sober curatorial annotation. It is, in that sense, a kind of 
Gesamtkunstwerk of denied authenticity. 
Figure 1: Wicker Suitcase belonging to Arendt’s Tante Ezie.  She bought it for her tour of the Crimean, 
where she danced for the Kaiser’s troops.  (Photo: Bill McCormack) 
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The panel of family antecedents invokes the kind of historical photographs we either possess 
ourselves or have seen in the homes of others, those collections of framed photographs, 
sometimes faded or damaged, that are part of our own western bourgeois version of ancestor 
worship. The artist uses grey paper and monochromatic colors for the drawings and their captions, 
evoking materials that have faded with time, or black and white films from the early 20th century. 
At the same time, each family has its idiosyncratic characters, and ancestral pictures often go with 
stories that summarize the character, as in the name-cum-title of a gallery of pseudo-noble 
ancestors that can be easily spoofed. The antedecents of Shenitzer’s putative Arendt are her 
(Great) Great Grandfather Friedrich Aaron (the caption mistakenly refers to him as Great 
Grandfather), depicted in 18th-century costume and identified as the “inventor of the stacked heel,” 
Great Grandmother Rose Aharon, née Finck, inventor of the adjustable shoe-last, and Great 
Grandfather Moses Aharon, who “never lived up to his father’s expectations and ended up claiming 
the patents for his wife’s inventions,” among others.  
Jarringly, on display nearby is a set of adjustable wooden shoe stretchers accompanied by two 
labels, one suggesting that “Hannah Arendt took obsessive care of her shoes, a family tradition;” a 
claim backed up by a saying, apparently handed down in the family: “Respect your shoes, and the 
world will respect you.” The other label connects between the image caption for Rose Aharon and 
Figure 2: Adjustable shoe-lasts invented by Hannah Arendt’s Great Grandmother Rose Aharon. Rose’s 
husband stole the patent. (Photo: Bill McCormack) 
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the objects on display: “Adjustable shoe lasts invented by Hannah Arendt’s Great Grandmother 
Rose Aharon. Rose’s husband stole the patent.” The circularity of the references and the solidity 
(and antique character) of the object on display create cohesion and verisimilitude, and thus offer 
a hermetic moment of initiation into a true/false family tradition. What is true about it is not 
disclosed. The claim made by the drawn image, which is not a historical photograph and hence 
lacks all authenticity, though not plausibility, is backed up by the object, which is incorrectly called 
a “shoe last” but looks authentic. The result is a précis of the show as a whole: a circle of 
hermeneutical confusions about what is real or true and what isn’t. 
Significantly missing among the antecedents and from the women in Hannah Arendt’s putative 
family is an image of her mother, who is never depicted, although she is mentioned in some of the 
captions. (For example, she is mentioned in the caption for Madame Solinka, the medium regularly 
consulted by Hannah Arendt’s mother.) On the other hand, the artist’s own mother makes a cameo 
appearance in one of the images of the “Sports” panel where she is depicted as a swimmer. The 
caption names “Sarah Pomeranc,” but the uninitiated viewer would not know that the woman 
looking back at her confidently was the artist’s mother. The caption further states that Sarah “easily 
defeated Hannah Arendt in the Women’s Triathlon” and “called Hannah ‘that Yecke.’” While denying 
access to “Hannah Arendt,” the rich tapestry of intimate images in fact provides a kaleidoscopic 
inventory of the artist’s own imagination, populated by partly actual and partly invented characters 
and experiences.  
Figure 3: Hannah’s Great-Grandparents (photo: Miriam Shenitzer 2019) 
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The show thus issues a veiled invitation to engage with the very private inner life and re/collections 
of the artist herself using a narrative superimposed on the figure of Hannah Arendt. This 
hermeneutical double-take thus preserves the privacy of the artist who lavishly draws from her 
own experience and from objects collected over time and imbued with personal meaning, while 
forestalling all curiosity that would attempt to know the real Hannah Arendt better than she knew 
herself. 
Figure 4: "Sarah Pomeranc, who easily defeated Hannah Arendt in the women’s 
triathalon.  She called Hannah ‘that Yecke’" (photo: Miriam Shenitzer 2019) 
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Aniconic portraiture and the freedom to remain invisible 
Shenitzer’s faux-biographical portraiture puts a life on display, though not the one the viewer is 
invited, tongue-in-cheek, to imagine. The putative “Hannah Arendt” is individualized, but she is also 
thoroughly hidden. Just as the subject’s mother never appears, the putative Hannah Arendt also 
rarely appears in person, and only in forms that disallow the formation of a clear image. Instead, 
we get pictures, as if from a neglected drawer, a cigar-box with the discards that didn’t make it into 
any official album, or an album assembled from the pictures that somehow made it across the 
historical abyss that is never mentioned. In place of a portrait of Hannah Arendt we get a thick, 
though veiled, image of the artists’ own memory fragments and jumbled references that are so 
typical of our family traditions: half-truths and barely remembered bits and pieces, things they 
carried, and that are all that we have to pass on to the next generation. The “putative life of Hannah 
Arendt” affirms the fragmentary character of our personal lives and underscores the 
disjointedness of disrupted lives.  
My purpose was to show the subterranean connections between Shenitzer’s “putative life of 
Hannah Arendt” and Hannah Arendt’s insistence on maintaining the boundaries between public 
and private lives as a condition of freedom, dignity, and humanity. In place of using readily 
Figure 5: Ashtray (Photo: Bill McCormack) 
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available, but ultimately facile and essentially questionable biographical conventions, Shenitzer’s 
work draws attention to our essential ignorance of any but our own life. As we traverse the putative 
life on display, we realize just how much our lives are lived with others, given and determined by 
others, by the personages that populate and make our reality. The life at the center emerges from 
the negative space, from the undepicted, in the interstices between the remembered and 
forgotten, the putative and the real.  
The assembled images and objects constitute an “archive” of sorts. As Jacques Derrida writes in 
Archive Fever (1996), the arche of the archive alludes to both commencement and commandment. 
The title of the visual archive, A Putative Life of Hannah Arendt, provides the directive on how to view 
the images. Like all historical evidence from which we attempt to retrieve or reconstruct the past, 
the visual archive of this putative life resists our attempts to impose prior knowledge, or prior 
assumptions, on the being that appears in the images, artifacts, and captions. We are to suspend 
our assumptions and allow for an encounter of a different life, a different personage, a different 
way of telling a story to take place. 
Shenitzer’s putative life of Hannah Arendt intuits the “relatedness” of the self that Arendt sought 
to reassert in her thinking about what it means to be human. This “related” self—as Andrew 
Benjamin (2018) argues in a recent paper—“twists itself free from what […] Heidegger criticized as 
a ‘metaphysics of subjectivity’” (215). In place of the isolated self of the thinker, often invoked in 
iconic photographs that might appear on book covers, Shenitzer’s Arendt appears in an array of 
imagined figures and coincidental configurations. In the manner of a family album that neither fails 
nor succeeds in documenting the emergence of a character, while inadvertently documenting the 
styles, social habits, and historical contexts of a life, Shenitzer’s drawings, artifacts and inscriptions 
capture the milieu, the aura, and the possibilities inherent in a particular time and a particular 
place. The particular time and particular place evoked in the putative life series is that of the 1920s 
and 30s, somewhere in Central Europe, somewhere in the “unbearable lightness of being,” as Milan 
Kundera titled his breakout novel about private lives on the margins of the 1968 Prague Spring. 
The putative life of Hannah Arendt is constructed from memory fragments of unknown origins that 
are nevertheless real and suggest familiarity. We become acquainted with a persona, a character, 
without being entirely sure of the knowledge conferred by this archive. 
Defying the biographical convention that the early life of a personage adumbrates their eventual 
greatness, Shenitzer depicts the putative early life of Hannah Arendt as a set of ordinary moments, 
serendipitously captured and preserved in a visual archive of seeming trivia. This vindication of the 
everyday, the intimate, the fleeting moment, the odd relationship on the margins of a life, captures 
the tapestry of emotions and attachments that are often ignored, emotions of joy and 
disappointment and attachments of friendship and distrust that are here foregrounded as 
formative and normative in how we turn out as human beings. By retrieving, albeit virtually, the 
putative life of Hannah Arendt, Shenitzer’s visual archive serves as a stage for the life of the 
emotions. Emotions and encounters constitute links and bonds between individuals where 
concepts and classifications fail us. 
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By creating the simulacrum of a putative life Shenitzer both asserts authority of access and 
memory preservation as well as relinquishes all claims to authoritative depiction. Gesturing at the 
ineffability of the true self, the putative life of Hannah Arendt denies as well as affirms access to 
the persona at the center of the series. The artist is thus in equal parts mystagogue and demystifier, 
enchanter and disenchanter. 
The artist as collector 
In the passage from Arendt’s introduction to her edition of Walter Benjamin’s Illuminations that I 
placed at the beginning of this essay, Arendt illustrates Benjamin’s obsession with collecting books, 
many of which he proudly acknowledged not to have read, and quotations, with a view to pursuing 
an ideal of writing that would consist exclusively of quotations. Arendt perceptively describes what 
Benjamin shared with Franz Kafka (and, one might add, with Leo Strauss [2002, 69–70, passim]), 
which is a realization that dawned on Benjamin only gradually, namely, that the loss of the 
authority that tradition had previously bestowed on revealed or uncovered (unconcealed, 
unverborgen) truths had left truth bereft of a certain “consistence” (Arendt 2019, li). To Benjamin’s 
chapter in which these considerations unfold, Arendt gives the title “Perlentaucher” or “The Pearl 
Diver,” which is her metaphor for the collector. As a thinker of the modern condition (see Arendt 
1958, 1961), Arendt describes not only the fracturing of the beautifully unified world of pre-modern 
humanity but interprets the works of liminal modernists like Benjamin and Kafka who articulate 
the unraveling of the consistence of the modern project from their own socially marginal 
perspective as members of a tribe of colonized colonizers and a “pariah” people (see Arendt 1978). 
In Arendt’s reading of Benjamin, the fracturing of tradition, and of the abeyance of the function of 
tradition as providing “consistence” to received truths, finds expression in literary work that is more 
poetic and aphoristic than prosaic, linear, or systematic. Arendt thereby explains Benjamin’s 
seeming failure to produce anything larger or more sustained than essays that are at best to be 
classified as “criticism.” The form and style of his writing is thus a true reflection of how he perceives 
and works through the phenomena he engages with. In terms of perception and representation, 
what is essential here is Arendt’s attention to the difference between metaphor and allegory, a 
subject she discusses in connection with Benjamin’s friendship with Brecht and his distance from 
Adorno who rightly, as Arendt believes, dismissed Benjamin’s Marxism as “vulgar,” i.e., as lacking 
an appreciation for dialectics. Arendt sees Benjamin as someone who appreciated the metaphoric 
character of all things, the smaller the better, by which he turns his back on the preference for 
allegory, common among rationalist philosophers of all stripes, for whom essence precedes 
existence.  
Much like Benjamin, as described by Arendt, The Putative Life of Hannah Arendt created by Shenitzer 
revels in the miniature, the faux objets d'art, as a form of representation. Her work presupposes 
not so much the difficulty of retrieving tradition in general but rather the denial of return of a past 
shattered by the Holocaust. There is nothing “handed down in one solid piece” and even the “coral 
and pearls” on display, as if rescued from a shipwreck, are recognizably inauthentic (Arendt 2019, 
lii). The reason this works, or rather the effect achieved by attributing the images, objects, and 
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memory fragments “preserved” and put on display in the labels to a putative life of Hannah Arendt, 
is that “Hannah Arendt” provides a sub-structure, a named, auratic persona, to which these 
memory fragments can be plausibly affixed. (I am suggesting the term “auratic persona,” 
combining [and contrasting] Walter Benjamin’s notion of “aura” with Deleuze and Guattari who 
speak of “conceptual personae”; see Young 2013). It further works because the putative persona 
serves to conceal something that is simultaneously revealed, namely, the actuality and reality of 
the memory fragments, miniatures of lived recollection, that are put on full display without being 
fully identified for what they truly are. What the viewer, uninitiated as s/he remains into the 
biographical sources of origin of the linguistic and visual elements, engages with is therefore a true 
representation of realities disguised as falsehoods, much like Jewish tradition treats the surface 
level of the sacred text of the Torah.  
Why Arendt/“Arendt” in the first place? The work is part of a series of putative lives of “great 
European thinkers” that, at present, also includes “Walter Benjamin” and “Mikhail Bakhtin,” in 
addition to “Hannah Arendt” (for Arendt’s take on “greatness”, see Arendt 1961, 47.) The choice of 
personae indicates auratic presences, a pantheon of sorts, mediated by particular names. This 
onomatopoeic conjuring shines a light on the dialectic of presence and absence, on the vanishing 
of the recalled. The choice of names—everyone knows, ought to know, ought to have heard and, 
in fact, read them—focuses attention on the interconnected problems of knowledge-production, -
transmission, and –inheritance, on both the levels of past knowledge and the making-present 
(Vergegenwärtigung) of a faux-biographical archive. The name provides a literal vanishing point 
around which the images and objects are arranged, with the captions providing the thread that 
connects images and objects to that vanishing point.  
Like Arendt with regard to Benjamin (see Arendt 2019, liii-lv), whose attitude toward collecting 
value-less objects calls into question the commitment of the collector toward preservation and 
hence neither confers market value nor intrinsic meaning on the collected objects, so it seems with 
Shenitzer’s Arendt as well. The randomness of the (re-)collected moments, grounded as they may 
be in memories of unmarked origin, creates a voluminous assemblage that, both, in spite and 
because of its persuasive range, destabilizes the image evoked by the totality of images and 
objects. We walk away uncertain of the “take-away” or “cash value” of the encounter.  
Another parallel between Arendt’s observation on the effect of Benjamin’s approach to collecting 
and Shenitzer’s Arendt is the appearance of whimsicality that arises from the utter disregard for 
“public significance” characteristic of the flâneur: 
[S]ince this “deepest urge” in the collector has no public significance whatsoever
but results in a strictly private hobby, everything “that is said from the angle of the
true collector” is bound to appear as “whimsical” as the typically Jean Paulian vision
of one of those writers “who write books not because they are poor, but because
they are dissatisfied with the books which they could buy but do not like” […].
(Arendt 2019, liv-lv)
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Shenitzer describes humor as a tool she uses to deal with the emotional force of the recollections 
that provide the sujet as well as the impetus for her work (Shenitzer 2019). In Arendt’s reading of 
Benjamin, the whimsical arises from the recruitment of objects of putative public significance for 
the purpose of seemingly satisfying a merely private obsession. What confers a peculiar 
significance on this act of withdrawal is the background of dark times, of “an era of public darkness” 
(lv). By eschewing the representation of an actual Arendt, by giving us a simulacrum of biographical 
actualities instead, by offering moments of uncertain veracity drawn or constructed from real 
fragments of memory of uncertain provenance, Shenitzer speaks to those dark times without 
naming them. Herein lies her “collector’s” withdrawal from public significance that gives her 
“putative Arendt” the misleading appearance of mere whimsicality. As Arendt writes about 
Benjamin,  
there […] appears a disturbing factor to announce that tradition may be the last 
thing to guide him and traditional values by no means be as safe in his hands as 
one might have assumed at first glance. (Arendt 2019, iv) 
Even more pertinent and perhaps key to Shenitzer’s work is another observation Arendt makes 
about Benjamin as a “collector.” In contrast to the traditional private collector who transforms, 
while preserving, a past for a present, but inadvertently wreaks some sort of destruction upon it 
(“the heir and preserver unexpectedly turns into a destroyer,” lvi), Benjamin is exempt from this 
charge of appropriation because he already finds the objects of his interest (children’s books, the 
Shma’ Yisrael engraved on two grains of wheat, etc.) already severed from any meaningful tradition. 
In other words, his manner of collecting indicates, rather than wreaks, destruction. Using this as a 
possible analogy one may be able to describe the logic of Shenitzer’s use of “Arendt” as a persona 
or an icon that is “collected” or picked up as a “coral or pearls” from the debris washed up on the 
shores of a post-Holocaust world. By making Hannah Arendt the object of her work of memory 
collection and rearrangement, preferably displayed within the context of a bourgeois home, a 
cabinet, a private museum-type setting, she creates a new, appropriated, de- and re-
contextualized, present/absent figure called “Hannah Arendt” that denies the possibility of 
asserting authenticity, historicity, or the authority of certain access to tradition or the past. 
Staging Dis/Appearance: Shenitzer’s Arendt from the perspective of performance theory 
Heeding the maxim that “every artist paints (her)self” (Eisler 1987), Shenitzer’s work relinquishes 
the illusion that it could be otherwise. What appears, then, in the putative life of Hannah Arendt is 
Shenitzer’s autobiography in disguise, a self-portrait in stages, echoes, fragments of the 
remembered, forgotten, and suggested. Just as Rembrandt might paint himself in historical 
costume (or like early 20th-century modern Ottoman citizens would pose as Palestinian peasants 
to have their portraits taken by the Armenian photographer across from the Jaffa-Gate), Shenitzer 
portrays “herself” in the guise of a putative Arendt. The name that provides the focal point is the 
screen onto which the artist projects a kaleidoscope refracting her own fragmented self.  
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In order to “work” as a work of faux-biographical art, the series could have played toward 
verisimilitude. Shenitzer could have used pseudo-historical photographs instead of drawings, 
creating simulacra of an actual past. The mixture of drawn images, the handwritten labels, and 
pseudo-objects mixed in with actual could-be-authentic objects the artist forces the viewer to 
recognize the installation as contrivance and artifice, disrupting the possibility of illusion. Ready to 
suspend disbelief, viewers sometimes fail to realize that Shenitzer never signed the compact of 
illusion.  
What is going on here may be illustrated, by way of contrast, in Rebecca Schneider’s writing on 
theatrical reenactment (2011). Schneider vividly describes the impossible mandate and the abiding 
mystery of theater, which is to make the absent present. The mandate of reenactment is to render 
a past present and bring it to experience. But the past is past and unavailable, and our means of 
representation are not just limited, but positively distorting. To have full access to a past would 
mean to visit it, be in it, live it, as in the fantasy of time travel.7 All reenactment—in whatever form 
of artistic or scholarly production—rests on the acknowledgment that a repetition of the past is 
neither possible nor desirable. As Schneider describes in relation to one of her examples, the 
Wooster Group’s literal reenactment of an earlier work by Jerzy Grotowski, the more precise the 
reenactment, the more “eerily false” it rings (112). Schneider, leaning on Dunkelberg (2005), 
describes the experience as follows: “Indeed, watching the labor of exact replication from the 
audience, it seems as though the more they get the reenactment exactly right, the more uncannily 
wrong it begins to feel” (112). If one takes that reenactment of an earlier play, its precise quotation, 
as one end of a spectrum and places Shenitzer’s Putative Arendt on its other end, one may arrive at 
the following observation. Whereas the Wooster Group’s precise imitation of its original feels eerily 
false, Shenitzer’s complete obscuring of the original, to the point of making it vanish, except for the 
name on which it hangs, feels perplexingly authentic. 
More carefully considered, all consciousness of the past is always the present consciousness of a 
past and hence the index of a present. Reenactment, repetition, imitation, quotation, and the like, 
when sustained by a compact of illusion and the suspension of disbelief, is then a form of escape 
into a virtual past, a form of repressing our self-awareness of the present. When art shines a light 
on this dialectic and disrupts the illusion (as in a Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt), we are reminded 
that the past, precisely because it is beyond our reach, is at an advantage over the present. All 
retrieval is purchased at the loss in the values of memory, authenticity, and genuineness. Because 
of this inevitable loss, promise of access to the past, even illusory access, is so highly prized.  
But it is not at all certain that such access is even sought by Shenitzer. In fact, the “real” Hannah 
Arendt, putatively present in the archive of her writings, letters, images, interviews etc., disappears 
behind the “putative” archive of faux authentic images, captions, and objects that, at the same time, 
act as a kind of ghost photography showing material traces of a spirit “Arendt” who oscillates 
between appearing and disappearing. 
Despite the very different means and virtually opposite stance toward the problem of mimesis 
(one perhaps rooted in a Jewish, rather than Christian, disposition toward the the-horein of 
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aesthetic production), Shenitzer complicates the assumptions of sincerity that might be expected 
in an aesthetic re/production of a deadly serious past. One might say that by using the most 
“sketchy” of all artistic media (i.e., drawing), and by placing the faux-bios in architectural spaces that 
evoke the false solidity of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century bourgeois spaces of 
ostentatious arrivistes homes, Shenitzer creates something that is so obviously ironic that it 
becomes serious: in a secondary seriousness about that which is beyond earnest representation, 
commemoration, or (G-d forbid) reenactment. In this context, the very suggestion of “camp” attains 
a different meaning. 
Inheritance or appropriation? 
Schneider’s wrestling with “reenactment” as a characteristic of mimetic stagecraft is helpful in 
thinking about the dialectic of inheritance and appropriation. Hannah Arendt, in the preface to 
Between Past and Future (1961), cites the French poet and writer René Char, to indicate the problem 
she aims to describe in her own thinking about the space between inherited past and made future, 
whereby past, present, and future seem to share the property of being public rather than merely 
private and hence “idiotic” (71). In Arendt’s reading, the history of modern revolutions is not so 
much a continuum, as it might be for Hegel or Marx, rather than a series of moments when men 
and women were released from the opaque sadness of private lives and placed in that existential 
space where past and future significantly intersected in lives called upon to regenerate that 
eminent space that is at the heart of meaningful, i.e. political, life, in the non-trivial sense of the 
political. Arendt also makes it clear that the “lost treasure” pursued by those who saw themselves 
placed on the stage of history and in the spotlight of public deeds was ultimately a “mirage,” which 
may be her way of saying, a fiction (Arendt 1961, 4–5). 
In the passage quoted by Arendt, Char speaks of an “inheritance without testament.” In his words, 
Notre heritage n’est précédé d’aucun testament (Arendt 1961, 3). Arendt may have been drawn to this 
quote because of the existentialist implications of an “inheritance without testament.” What better 
illustration of what Heidegger means by “thrownness” (Geworfenheit)!  
Our more or less literal appropriations of the past are both inevitable and ethically problematic. It 
is inevitable for us to appropriate the past, with or without mandate, because without 
appropriation we would have no language at all, no means of communication, no forms of 
expression, and nothing to express. It is ethically problematic because of the lack of mandate, in 
other words, because of our situation “beyond all tradition,” a situation diagnosed by Friedrich 
Nietzsche but more virulently and viscerally experienced as true by the generations who witnessed 
the destructive forces that led to, and became manifest in, the two World Wars of the twentieth 
century. 
Lack of mandate, thrownness, loss of tradition, and the like mid-twentieth-century tropes of 
malaise were forcefully rejected by the Jewish philosopher Emil Fackenheim in his later work, post-
1967, when he began to articulate a new type of mandate, one emerging from Auschwitz. In 
Fackenheim’s reading, Auschwitz revealed, as a matter of absolute moral clarity, the mandate not 
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to allow Hitler any posthumous victories. Fackenheim called this the 614th-commandment, one 
more than the 613 commandments rabbinic tradition counted as having been revealed at Sinai. 
This is how he put it: 
Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthumous victories. They are commanded to 
survive as Jews, lest the Jewish people perish. They are commanded to remember 
the victims of Auschwitz lest their memory perish. They are forbidden to despair of 
man and his world […], lest they cooperate in delivering the world over to the forces 
of Auschwitz. Finally, they are forbidden to despair of the God of Israel, lest Judaism 
perish. (Fackenheim 1972, 84) 
This is not the place to critique Fackenheim, even though it may well be asked what it means that 
he formulated his famous postulate very much in light of, and in response to, a completely different 
event, namely, the 1967 Six Day War in the Middle East, giving the present moment meaning in 
light of a past that, to him and many others, all of a sudden seemed repeatable. The imperative he 
formulated was based on a profound fear of repetition on the historic stage of an event that had 
to remain unique and, in an eerie sense, divine. In other words, far from representing a simple act 
of accepting an inheritance or formulating a mandate of the past, Fackenheim’s 614th 
commandment (transgressive as it is, as it is explicitly forbidden in the Torah to add to or subtract 
from it) is a mandate issued by a present on a past, and hence perhaps another case of 
appropriation without mandate, inheritance without testament.  
Much like the men described by Arendt who were forced to conduct “all relevant business in the 
affairs of the country […] in deed and word” and thus “constitute(d) willy-nilly a public realm” 
(Arendt 1961, 3), Fackenheim’s generation found itself in a similar place where, in hindsight, the 
past was disclosed as issuing a mandate to which one had to respond. Or, rather, the present 
threat of an unknown future focused the attention of men and women living in a time dominated 
by “knaves or fools” (Arendt 1961, 3) to act on their own and extract from a fractured past what 
mandates they could. The reason why Arendt became an outcast from Jewish politics was that she 
derived different mandates from the same past, usable ones, to be sure, but perhaps not toward 
the same vision of the future as, say, Fackenheim. 
Is Shenitzer’s Arendt indicative of a retreat to “the weightless irrelevance of […] private affairs, once 
more separated from ‘the world of reality’,” an expression of “the ‘sad opaqueness’ of a private life 
centered about nothing but itself” (Arendt 1961, 4)? In other words, is the life depicted a purely 
private life, or does the depiction, the choice of name as cipher, the surreptitious revelation of the 
artist’s private moments, also entail the assertion of a mandate emanating from the past, even in 
its “campy” denial of any relevance of such a possibility? Would this require for the show to be 
about the “real” historical Arendt? Like Arendt, Shenitzer is compelled to reenact by the existential 
distance between the past and us, between us and the past. The question is, then, what art can do 
to draw our attention to that space between past and future that we inhabit. What kind of past, 
what kind of future?  
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Like one of the erstwhile Sabatians and Frankists, who felt mandated to cross over into the world 
of darkness where the sparks of light are trapped that needed to be redeemed and restored to 
their proper place, so as to repair the cosmic order shattered in the beginning, Shenitzer feels 
compelled to lift up the fragments of her own memory, those “coral and pearls,” that signify her 
(and through her artwork now also our) connection to a past that gains its significance from being 
remembered, represented, reenacted, and, if need be: reinvented, so as to be carried forward. 
What remains unacknowledged in Fackenheim, namely, the sleight-of-hand by which he attributes 
the mandate he formulates for the future to the past, becomes visible in Shenitzer’s “Arendt.” By 
substituting her own memory fragments for those of an actual Arendt, Shenitzer’s putative 
“Arendt” reenacts and renders present elements of actual pasts to give us the mimetic opportunity 
to propel ourselves forward, once again, from where “Arendt” stood, to see our present in light of 
a putative, and hence not necessarily usable, past. This, then, is the “public” side of this work of art: 
that it reminds us that we retain responsibility for the past precisely because we inherited its 
various and contradictory mandates.  
Naming the treasure 
Being without tradition (or testament), we are disconnected or untethered from the past. This, no 
less than the sudden nameless (because unheralded and unanticipated) gift of freedom obtained 
by means of revolution described by Arendt, is a condition that lacks a name. Whether or not to 
treasure it is as uncertain to us as was that gift of freedom obtained by means of revolution, which 
means by violence. We, the unintentional heirs of a future never heralded by any past, depend on 
fragments of remembrance that historians no more or less than artists assemble into a treasure 
chest, to be carried forward. As such we are manufacturing the testament for the future. Arendt 
resolves the riddle when she translates “treasure” into the historical language proffered by, and 
used in regard to, those revolutions: public happiness and public freedom, with the emphasis 
resting on “public.” Unbeknownst to themselves, so Arendt, that was what those men in 
revolutionary times unexpectedly found in their hands: a new, unheralded and unnamed thing 
that may be called public, or the republic.8 
Of the situation of the historian of thought Arendt writes as follows: 
If one were to write the intellectual history of our century, not in the form of 
successive generations, where the historian must be literally true to the sequence 
of theories and attitudes, but in the form of the biography of a single person, aiming 
at no more than a metaphorical approximation to what actually happened in the 
minds of men, this person’s mind would stand revealed as having been forced to 
turn full circle not once but twice, first when he escaped from thought into action, 
and then again when action, or rather having acted, forced him back into thought. 
(Arendt 1961, 9; emphasis added) 
What I find intriguing in this statement is the highlighted part of the sentence where Arendt 
envisages the task of writing history metaphorically, through the prism of a particular life, as “no 
more than a metaphorical approximation to what actually happened in the minds of men”. The 
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plural matters in that the individual biography provides the medium or metaphor for what 
happened in the minds of men, of which the individual is only one among others. It strikes me that 
this is precisely what Shenitzer does in her “putative life of Hannah Arendt.” She picks a name and 
makes the life she concocts from her own memory fragments a window into what obtained in the 
lives of those who, like Arendt, were compelled to make certain choices in a particular world and 
situation. Less confident of what went on in those minds, Shenitzer nevertheless construes a 
plausible life that, in all its particularity, bears metaphorical character. And just as anticipated by 
Arendt writing on “in-between” periods, i.e., periods of contemplation rather than action, Shenitzer 
zeroes in on the world between the wars, the very period of Arendt, Benjamin, and others who 
found themselves challenged to make sense of the shambles of the past while readying 
themselves, unbeknownst to themselves, for futures into which they were soon enough propelled, 
forced from contemplation into action, a future that to us is a fractured past and that reminds us 
of the preciousness of the short-lived-ness of those moments of reprieve, including our own. 
1 Ute Frevert is director at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin. The remarks I am referring 
to were made in a speech at Boston University, on October 15, 2018. See http://www.bu.edu/jewishstudies/
calendar/the-elie-wiesel-memorial-lectures/. While Frevert, who studies the history of emotions, spoke of the past, 
I am extending her observation to the present and to the general question of action in history. 
2 “Difficult Freedom” is the title of a collection of writings by French Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas. See 
Lévinas (1976) and (1990). 
3 See the German Strafgesetzbuch, Paragraph 323c. On the pre-history of this law see Haubrich (2001, 56ff). 
4 The legal principle is often formulated as “ad impossibilia nemo tenetur” or “ultra posse nemo tenetur.” See Fellmeth 
and Horwitz (2009). On Kant, see Milz (2002, 182). 
5 “Das man” is the early Heidegger’s term for the anonymous force we may call peer pressure, the world of 
conventional morality, etc.  
6 It is not entirely clear whether misspellings or grammatical errors in the German of the titles and captions are 
intentional or unintentional, or whether the viewer is meant to take note of them, or how one is to react to them. 
In this case (“den Ganz” instead of “die Gans” of the original nursery rhyme), the misspelling gave rise to a hilarious 
(and compelling) interpretation offered by Arendt biographer Thomas Meyer during the opening symposium. 
7 Time travel, that wonderful fantasy, is fuelled by its paradoxical impossibility: that the past in which we want to 
insert ourselves would no longer be the actual past but something new, an alternative past, changed by our having 
inserted ourselves in it. The visited past is transformed rather than “immortal.” See Arendt (1961). 
8 A careful glance at the history of early modern political theory reveals that the modern republic was anything but 
unheralded or unnamed. It appeared in reality after centuries of theorizing the ancient Hebrew republic. 
Notes 
147 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 5 (1) (2019) 
Works Cited 
“About A Putative Life of Hannah Arendt, Exhibit and Symposium.” 2018. Elie Wiesel Center for Jewish Studies, Boston 
University. http://www.bu.edu/jewishstudies/about-the-exhibit/ 
Arendt, Hannah. 1961. Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought. New York: Viking. 
———. (1963) 2006. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Penguin. 
———. 2018. Die Freiheit frei zu sein. Munich: dtv. 
———. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2019. “Introduction.” In Walter Benjamin, Illuminations. Translated by Harry Zohn. Boston: Mariner. 
———. 1978. The Jew as Pariah. New York: Grove. 
Benjamin, Andrew. 2018. “Being and Appearing: Notes on Arendt and Relationality.” Arendt Studies 2: 215–232. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/arendtstudies20183139 
Braun, Günther E. 1975. “‘Sollen impliziert können’ und der entscheidungstheoretische Kontext.” Journal for 
General Philosophy of Science Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 6 (2): 311–330. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01800792  
Derrida, Jacques. 1996. Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. Translated by Eric Prenowitz. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/465144 
Dunkelberg, Kermit. 2005. “Confrontation, Simulation, Admiration: The Wooster Group’s Poor Theater.” TDR: The 
Drama Review 49 (3): 43–57. https://doi.org/10.1162/1054204054742444 
Encke, Julia. 2018. “Hannah Arendt über Freiheit. Ein unwahrscheinlicher Bestseller.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitungi, 
March 27. https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/buecher/autoren/gespraech-ueber-hannah-arendts-
bestseller-die-freiheit-frei-zu-sein-15509337.html 
Eisler, Colin. 1987. “‘Every Artist Paints Himself’: Art History as Biography and Autobiography.” Social Research 54 
(1): 73–99. 
Fackenheim, Emil. 1972. God’s Presence in History. New York: Harper. 
Fellmeth, Aarom X., and Maurice Horwitz. 2009. “Ad impossibilia nemo tenetur.” Guide to Latin in International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acref/9780195369380.001.0001 
Haubrich, Edgar. 2001. Die unterlassene Hilfeleistung. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1976. Difficile liberté. París: albin michel.  
———. 1990. Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. Translated by Seán Hand. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Milz, Bernard. 2002. Der gesuchte Widerstreit: Die Antinomie in Kants Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft. Berlin: de Gryuter. 
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110881141 
Schneider, Rebecca. 2011. Performing Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical Reenactment. London: Routledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203852873 
Schöndorf, Harald. 1985. “’Denken-Können’ und ‘Wollen-Können’ in Kants Beispielen für den kategorischen 
Imperativ.” Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 39 (4): 549–573. 
Shenitzer, Miriam. 2019. “Putative Lives of Great European Thinkers.” http://miriamshenitzer.com/putative-lives-
of-great-european-thinkers/. 
Stangneth, Bettina. 2014. Eichmann vor Jerusalem: Das unbehelligte Leben eines Massenmörders. Reinbek bei 
Hamburg: Rowohlt-Taschenbuch-Verlag. 
Strauss, Leo. 2002. The Early Writings. Translated and edited by Michael Zank. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
148 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 5 (1) (2019) 
Wolin, Richard. 2001. “Heidegger’s Children.” The New York Times, December 16, 2001. https://nyti.ms/2HyzUTV 
———. 2015. Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Young, Eugene B. 2013. Deleuze and Guattari Dictionary. New York: Bloomsbury. 
Biography 
Michael Zank is Full Professor in the Department of Religion and Director of the Elie Wiesel Center for Jewish 
Studies at Boston University. He is the author, most recently, of Jerusalem. A Brief History (2018), and Jüdische 
Religionsphilosophie als Apologie des Mosaismus (2016). http://blogs.bu.edu/mzank  
© 2019 Michael Zank 
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
